In this paper we introduce and develop a framework for visual data-hiding technologies 17 that aim at resolving emerging problems of modern multimedia networking. First, we introduce the main open issues of public network security, quality of services control and 19 secure communications. Secondly, we formulate digital data-hiding into visual content as communications with side information and advocate an appropriate information-
Introduction
The mass diffusion of digital media and the explosive growth of telecommunication 31 are reshaping the lifestyles of ordinary people, research and industry. Over the last decade, the rise of digital telecommunication technologies (including ATM, PSTN, 33 ISDN, ADSL, IP networks) has fundamentally altered how people work, think, communicate, and socialize. New emerging audio/visual applications have recently 35 appeared thanks to the public multimedia networks. This growth is especially observed in networked video applications such as video phones, video conferencing, 37 present the main problems to be addressed. Section 5 is dedicated to robust watermarking. Section 6 considers authentication, tamper proofing and watermark-29 assisted communications, and Sec. 7 presents secure communications. Section 8 concludes the paper.
31

Notation
We use capital letters to denote scalar random variables X, bold capital letters to 33 denote vector random variables X, corresponding small letters x and x to denote the realizations of scalar and vector random variables, respectively. The superscript
35
N is used to denote length-N vectors x = x N = {x [1] , x [2] , . . . , x[N ]} with ith element x [i] . We use X ∼ p X (x) or simply X ∼ p(x) to indicate that a random 37 variable X is distributed according to p X (x). The mathematical expectation of a random variable X ∼ p X (x) is denoted by E pX [X] 
or simply by E[X] and Var[X]
39 denotes the variance of X. Calligraphic fonts X denote sets X ∈ X and |X | denotes a cardinality of set. 41 congestion, can cause the video playback to be stopped until the receiver can resynchronize. Moreover, errors arising from lost data can affect multiple video 29 frames by temporal error propagation.
• Delay (real time), jitter (timing errors) and latency: streaming multimedia should 31 fit delay constraints since the video must be decoded and played in real-time. If the video data spends too much time in the network, it is useless even if it arrives 33 at the receiver. Buffering can reduce the effect of delay and jitter (timing errors). Latency can also be an issue when two-way communication is necessary.
35
• Finite bandwidth (network sharing, limited resources): bandwidth is the amount of data that can traverse the network or a part of the network at any given 37 time. Network bandwidth is a shared, limited resource and will vary with time. A network may not be able to guarantee that the required bandwidth for 39 transporting multimedia data will be available.
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In addition heterogeneity and time-variance are important factors for public 1 network multimedia communications. A heterogeneous network is a network whose parts (sub-networks) may have vastly unequal resources. For example, some parts 3 of a heterogeneous network may have abundant bandwidth and excellent congestion control while other parts of the network are overloaded and congested by overuse 5 or by a lack of physical network resources. Different receivers on a heterogeneous network can experience different performance characteristics. When streaming 7 video over a heterogeneous network, the video stream should be decodable at optimal quality for users with a good network connection, and at usable quality 9 for users with a poor connection. Time-variance implies that bandwidth, delay, loss, or other network characteristics can significantly vary over time, sometimes 11 drastically changing in a matter of seconds. The Internet (based on the underlying internet protocol, IP) main current flow control is the transmission control 13 protocol (TCP), which is based on a "best effort" type traffic, 4,57 intended for ordered reliable delivery of stream of data such as file transfer applications. The
15
second principal flow control of the Internet is the user datagram protocol (UDP), typically used for audio or video streaming, but it does not guarantee the integral 17 delivery of the data being transmitted and offers no control over the data loss ratio. This makes Internet a difficult network for transporting real-time multimedia data, 19 which is then an example of a heterogeneous, time-varying, network with unpredictable congestion and delays and no QoS control. Some proposals, which we will 21 not discuss here, have been proposed to add QoS to the Internet, including: multiple service classes, 29 usage-based schemes, 13 priority pricing, 38 or a bandwidth/buffer 23 allocation equilibrium approach. 36 However if a high QoS is easy to obtain for small networks, it appears then that a trade-off should be found between the lowest 25 service granularity of the QoS and the scalability of any proposed system. 27 Network security is no less important a problem of public networks. 28 Internet as a public network is a very challenging environment for secure and reliable transport of real-time multimedia data. Internet is a heterogeneous and 9 time-varying network, has no QoS control and no efficient and reliable mechanisms for copyright protection, access control and secure communications. Therefore, we 11 will below consider potential approaches that make at least partially possible to satisfy (or to complement existing solutions to) the above emerging problems. 
Network security
Multimedia Security and Quality-of-Service: Main Open Issues
Multimedia content security has a number of specific requirements that should allow 15 to answer to the following questions:
• Who has issued the multimedia content?
17
• Who is the content owner?
• When was the content issued?
19
• Who has access right to the content?
• Is the content modified?
21
• Where was the content modified?
• What was the original content before modification? 23 It is obvious that specialized protocols or hardware alone are not able to resolve all these questions. At the same time, new emerging requirements to secure Inter-25 net communications essentially extended the horizons of traditional cryptography protocols. A new paradigm has to answer not only the question of how to commu-27 nicate in a secure way but also how to communicate in a completely undetectable way over public networks. This subsequently leads to the extension of the concept 29 of covert communications and requires the creation of new "covert" multimedia channels. Finally, the related open problem of quality-of-service control requires 31 one to provide the answer on the question of how to communicate in a robust way providing end-to-end services?
33
The list of these diverse problems seems to be very broad and from a traditional point of view there does not seem to exist any common means of satisfying all 35 these requirements. However, there are some common aspects of secure and reliable communications that could be addressed by novel technologies based on digital 37 data-hiding.
Multimedia Data-Hiding
1
Multimedia data-hiding represents an alternative concept for public network security and secure communications and can be considered as an assisting functionality.
3
Multimedia data-hiding provides an additional "virtual" or covert channel of digital communications through the embedding of some secret unperceived information 5 directly into the multimedia content without extra meta data, headers, sophisticated specialized formats and attachments. This naturally leads to the concept of 7 a smart media where the features of the multimedia content are extended to extra functionalities that can be exploited for multimedia processing, communications, 9 security and content management.
The concept of a smart media can be generally characterized as:
11
• self-sufficient or self-embedding (no extra headers, meta data and attachments are needed);
13
• self-synchronizing (no synchronization information is used on the protocol side);
• self-authenticating (no access to the original data is required to establish the 15 content authenticity); • self-correcting and offering error concealment (no format protocol modifications 17 related to forward/backward error corrections are necessary).
Besides the obvious advantages listed above, multimedia data-hiding should 19 additionally provide:
• perceptually invisible data embedding;
21
• robust and content independent extraction of embedded information;
• scalability of the content for different heterogeneous networks and applications;
23
• security provided by a proper key management and undetectability of the hidden data presence by the existing detection tools.
25
We consider multimedia data-hiding with respect to three main applications that should address the open issues presented in Sec. 3:
27
• robust watermarking;
• authentication and tamper proofing;
29
• secure communications.
Robust watermarking is mainly used for copyright protection, content tracking 31 and content self-labeling. Authentication and tamper proofing target the certification of a given content originator, as well as the verification of its integrity and the 33 detection of local modifications in images, video and documents, or recovering of the original content based on available copy of the modified or tampered content.
35
Finally secure communications address the issue of secure content delivery over the public networks using two different possibilities. The first possibility is a visual 37 "encryption" or scrambling that should provide additional error resilience in the case of wireless networks and networks with packet losses and erasures. The second possibility is steganography that guarantees secure content delivery by hiding the 1 content to be securely communicated into the covert media whereas the presence of the hidden content presence should not be detected by various detection tools. 
Robust Watermarking
Robust watermarking is one of the most challenging research directions of data-5 hiding combining a number of multidisciplinary issues ranging from information theory and digital communications, estimation and detection theory, to image 7 processing and computer vision. Robust watermarking, from the informationtheoretic perspective, should provide the reliable communication of some energy 9 constrained payload m in the body of a multimedia content under a broad list of various intentional and unintentional attacks, those attacks constituting the 11 resulting watermarking channel. The protocol describing robust watermarking can be schematically explained as in Fig. 1 . This protocol consists of three main parts, i.e. information embedding or encoder, channel that represents the public network and the information extraction part or decoder.
15
The goal of the information embedder consists in the invisible "integration" of a specifically preprocessed payload m into the original (host) content x based on some secret key K. We assume that the message M , uniformly distributed over the message set M with the cardinality |M|, is encoded based on a secret key into some watermark w = w
We denote x to be a two-dimensional sequence typically representing the luminance of the original image. The ith element of x is denoted as x[i] where i = (n 1 , n 2 ) and x ∈ R N and N = N 1 × N 2 is the size of the host image. The message m typically has a length of 64 bits, i.e. |M| = 2, 64 and is content independent. In some cases, only a binary decision about the watermark presence/absence can be required: |M| = 2 (so-called 1-bit watermarking, i.e. log 2 |M| = 1 bit). As another example, the printing industry only requires 16 bits for document tracking aiming at identifying the distribution channels. In any case, the payload for robust watermarking is relatively modest and 8 S. Voloshynovskiy et al. rarely exceeds 100 bits. The embedding rule can be expressed as a mapping:
where m is a particular realization of the random message M,
is the stego data and x i can be used only partially as x i = {x [1] 
13
where d The channel is characterized as a transition probability p(y|w, x), and can be 17 quite general including both signal processing and geometrical distortions of the stego data. In the particular case of intentional attacks, the attacker aims at 19 removing the watermark w from y producing the attacked data y. The admissible attacker distortion is D 2 that is defined in the same way as (3) between vectors y 21 and y:
23
One should also note another possibility to define the attacker distortion between the original data x and the attacked data y. The decoder produces the estimate of 25M based on y using:m
27
where g(·) denotes the decoding rule and y = y N = {y [1] , y [2] , . . . , y[N ]} is the distorted stego data. The decoding error occurs whenM = M. A particular case of 29 generalized decoding rule g(·) is the maximum a posteriori (MAP) decoding rule, which minimizes the probability of error:
The cryptographic security of a robust watermarking system is considered as the code book structuring is known as a part of the algorithm for the attacker. However, it also reduces the entropy of the watermark as any conditioning
where SC is a structure of the code book and gives more information leakage for the attacker. Therefore, some special care should be taken to prevent this leakage 19 and to apply the data-hiding in such a way that this leakage will not be crucial for a given application. The first attempt to formalize the security of the robust 21 watermarking technologies has been done by Barni, Bartolini and Furon. ends, then the channel capacity is equal to its theoretical upper bound 9 :
29 If x is not known at both ends, then it acts as a strong interference. In the case of watermarking, the host data x is available at the encoder. Therefore, this encoder. In this case, the problem of data-hiding can be reformulated as a reliable 1 communication of the message m over the channel with noise z and interference x being known at the encoder but not at the decoder. The most general formulation 3 of such type of communications was considered by Gel'fand and Pinsker in 1980 in non-watermarking applications and the capacity of this scheme was found as 20 :
where U is an auxiliary random variable. The Gel'fand-Pinsker problem has a quite 7 simple intuitive interpretation using a random binning argument. If we denote a set of all elements (codewords) as 2 NI(U;Y )−ε and apply a random binning technique 9 we assume that each bin (subset) associated to a particular message has 2
NI(U;X)−ε
elements. It is then easy to find the total number of uniquely distinguished bins as Costa (1983) has considered the above problem in the Gaussian context and found that:
and C = 
15
Having considered the theoretical foundations of host interference cancellation using side information at the encoder, we concentrate on the practical data-hiding 17 schemes. We will assume a binary representation
where D can be binary D ∈ {0, 1} or multilevel D ∈ {1, 2, . . . , D} with D = |D|, using some suitable error correction codes and proper spreading. Additionally, the 21 sequence d can be modulated. The simplest case of modulation is M-PAM signal constellation that consists of M ≥ 2 equidistant real symbols centered on the origin, (Fig. 3) , where d 0 is the minimum distance between symbols. For equiprobable symbols the average symbol energy
The highest rate for the unencoded M-PAM is R = log 2 M. 27 However, contrarily to digital communications where the sequence d is directly used for the transmission over the noisy channel, the encoded message is combined 29 with the host data in digital data-hiding applications according to the additive model (2) . Depending on the different embedding rules (1), we can classify all 31 existing data-hiding techniques as those that do not use side information about the host data at the encoder, and those that use side information. Spread spectrum (SS) data embedding is historically the first and currently most 1 often used technique in practice technique for data-hiding. The SS data-hiding does not directly use information about the host image for the watermark encoding and 3 thus suffers from host interference: subsites that are used for the allocation of each bit of codeword c. Additionally, the watermark can be embedded exploiting particularities of the human visual system 13 (HVS), as a so-called perceptually adapted watermarking: The LSBM encoder embeds the data according to the next rule:
27
The image is first precoded based on an uniform quantizer Q(x) with a step ∆ and then the M-PAM watermark d is added to this image. The embedding distortion 12 S. Voloshynovskiy et al. is:
The LSBM decoder performs the direct estimation of the message:
The binary QIM encoder performs the quantization of the host image using two 5 sets of quantizers Q −1 (·) and Q +1 (·) that are shifted by ∆ with respect to each other:
where
distortion is:
11 Therefore, the embedding distortion for the LSBM is higher than that for the QIM. However, it is necessary to note that the LSBM can have the same embedding 13 distortion as the QIM, if one applies a distortion minimization procedure choosing the resulting quantization bin with the minimum possible distortion after final 15 addition of the M-PAM watermark. This will not affect the capacity, but it will decrease the embedding distortion. The QIM decoder performs the ML-estimation:
In contrary to the LSBM and the QIM, which do not use any prior information 19 about the attacking channel state, the SCS exploits the knowledge of the AWGN channel statistics at the encoder. The SCS encoder generates the stego data based 21 on the rule:
23
The parameter α is optimized to resist against the AWGN attack. It should be noted that when α = 1 the SCS corresponds to the QIM, as well as to the case when 14 This leads to a slight decrease of the performance. The SCS embedding distortion is:
The probabilities of error in spread spectrum and quantization-based data-
33
hiding techniques have different characters, that drastically influence the performance of these methods in different regimes. In particular, the probability of error for the spread-spectrum based data-hiding methods is computed as in digital 1 communications for M-PAM modulation (Fig. 4) including the additional impact of the host data expressed as the convolution
The fundamental difference with the quantization-based techniques consists in the periodic integration of the probability of the error over all bins that do not coincide 5 with the transmitted symbol constellation (Fig. 5) . Therefore, for high variance of AWGN attack, this error can increase more rapidly in contrast to the SS-based 7 data-hiding. The reader is referred to Ref. 41 for more details about performance analysis of different data-hiding techniques under various additive attacks.
9
The performance of different watermark encoding and modulation (embedding) techniques can be considered depending on an operational WNR: WNR = 11 10 log 10 σ 2 w σ 2 n for AWGN channels. Low-rate data-hiding achieves AWGN channel capacity in low-WNR regime while high-rate data-hiding is possible for relatively 13 high-WNR regime. The low-WNR regime is typical for robust digital watermarking when the attack is aiming at removing the watermark. In this case, the variance 15 of the attack might be higher than the variance of the watermark. In this case, the host interference is not crucial for approaching channel capacity and spread 17 spectrum based data-hiding can be sufficient. In this regime, two approaches to watermark encoding are mostly used in practice: • binary watermark encoding using binary low-rate error correcting codes with soft 1 decoding (Turbo codes, or LDPC codes);
• binary watermark encoding using the above binary codes with higher rates and 3 following replication.
The first approach is characterized by a lower probability of error while the 5 second one has a higher resistance against the cropping attack. It should be also noticed that the error correction codes for erasure channels can also be used to 7 withstand cropping attack. Additionally, properly designed repetitive watermark can be also used to recover from geometrical attacks that are characterized by an 9 affine transform, using self-synchronization.
10,31,50
The high-WNR regime makes it possible to increase the watermark embedding 11 rate for the same embedding distortions. In the general case, unencoded M-ary pulse amplitude modulation (PAM) can be used to approach channel capacity 13 within 1.53 dB (that is related to a shaping loss of uniform vs. Gaussian p.d.f. of watermark). Finally, a coded modulation is used in practice that combines
15
M-ary signaling with binary error correcting codes such as Turbo codes or LDPC codes. The host interference cancellation embedding is also necessary for this 17 regime. Therefore, methods based on Gel'fand-Pinsker (Costa) framework should be used. However, their performance will be very poor for the low-WNR regime.
19
Keeping in mind relatively low watermark embedding rate required for the robust watermarking applications, the SS-based methods could be recommended. More- into account texture and luminance masking in each sub band. The robustness against geometrical attacks is ensured based on a special periodical watermark. An 29 important issue of watermark security of periodical watermark is also resolved by increasing the watermark entropy and thus reducing the watermark predictability.
31
The watermark is not simply repeated like it is done in the majority of SS-based techniques but it is tiled with some key-dependent predistortions in such a way 33 that a non-authorized averaging of all tiles leads to the watermark self-destruction and thus watermark prediction is not very accurate. However, we should note that 35 although this technology is practically very robust to all attacks from the Stirmark benchmark, there is always the possibility that soon new more powerful attacks 37 might appear in the never ending data-hiding/attacker game.
Integrity Control, Tamper Proofing and 39
Watermark-Assisted Communications
The goals of integrity control and tamper proofing consists of the verification documents, and the recovering of the original content based on the available copy 1 of modified or tampered content. The generalized block-diagram of an integrity control and verification system is shown in Fig. 6 . This protocol is quite similar to 3 the robust watermarking ( Fig. 1) and consists of three main parts. The first part, information embedding, has the same purpose as robust watermarking, i.e. embed-5 ding of the payload b into the original data x with the specified distortion that should not exceed D 1 . However, a fundamental difference exists between these two 7 applications that consists in the nature of the payload b. The payload b has a higher rate (about 5-10 Kbits depending on the size of the original data). Moreover, the 9 payload b is content dependent and related to the original data by some mapping rule p(b|x) that might represent some hashing, features or even compressed version 11 of the original content. Therefore, depending on the final requirements it might be necessary to provide the embedding rate in the range of R = 1 − 2 bpp (bits per 13 pixels).
The second element of the protocol is the public network represented by some 15 channel with the transition matrix p(y|y ). The behavior of this channel also shows significant differences with the corresponding robust watermarking channel.
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Contrary to the robust watermarking channel, where the attacker is interested in impairing the reliable watermark detection/decoding subject to the constraint of 19 the maximum allowable distortion D 2 , the protocol attacker in this application has completely different objectives. The main goal of the attacker is to modify 21 or to counterfeit the content with the purpose of producing a new content with a modified visual appearance. For example, the content could be modified by replacing Therefore, from the attacker perspective the integrity of the document should be preserved in such a way that the authentication watermark will not be capable 9 enough to detect the introduced modifications. This is a very challenging task that has recently resulted in a lot of attention in the watermarking commu- proofing watermarks, and self-recovering watermarks.
Authentication and tamper proofing 23
While robust watermarking for copyright protection was clearly the first main research direction of the 1990s, watermarks for authentication and tamper 25 proofing have then been rapidly proposed for authentication and verification of integrity. Authentication aims at checking the authenticity of a document 27 and of its source, while tamper proofing detects unauthorized modifications. hashing are vulnerable to substitution attacks which exploit databases of images all protected with the same key. The cut-and-paste attack takes parts from two or 9 more of these protected images and paste them together (preserving the watermark synchronization) to form a new image. The collage attack is a cut-and-paste attack 11 which uses rather large parts: in that case these parts are individually validated by the decoder and only the boundaries between them are indicated as tampered.
13
Then a collage attack cannot be distinguished with certainty from simple local tampering, and can be seen as a protocol attack which creates the ambiguity Most of proposed authentication watermarks are strictly sensitive to any change, in the sense that any modification, even of a single pixel, is detected: they are said waveform coding, robust entropy coding and post-processing at the decoder. Datahiding techniques could be used for this purpose. Moreover, intentional content 21 modifications could be considered as channel degradation and appropriate strategies can be applied for self-recovering data.
23
The main practical approaches to self-recovering watermarking differ depending on the used payload (features, edges, compressed coefficients), data-embedding . Therefore, the higher the variance of the image, the lower is the accuracy of the estimate. A maximum likelihood (ML) estimate is most often applied to real 37 images to estimate the local image variance. It is a known fact that real images are highly non-stationary processes. The variance in the vicinity of the edges and 39 textures will thus be highly overestimated, 55 σ 2 MMSE will then be very large in these regions and no reliable estimate will be possible. Therefore, one can embed additional information about edges and textures in the watermark to reduce the 1 variance of the estimation, while flat regions that are characterized by relatively low variance can easily be reconstructed at the decoder. This approach to error-resilient 3 coding can be efficiently used for the QoS control and enhanced scalability of public networks. 
Joint source/channel coding with side information
All the above schemes can be considered in a generalized setup of joint 7 source/channel coding with side information. Since we have already considered channel coding with side information at the encoder in Sec. 5, we will focus in this 9 section on source coding with side information at the decoder.
We start by considering the problem of lossy compression with side information is to compress X in a lossy way with Y being known at the decoder but not at the encoder. First, we consider this problem for a Gaussian content and quadratic
. The encoder and the decoder communicate without error at a rate R bits per source symbol.
17
At the same time, the decoder has access to Y = X + Z (Fig. 9) , where X and Z are independent and , with the specified distortion D, that corresponds to a rate distortion function R(D) X|Y which assumes Y to be available at both encoder and decoder: with side information at the decoder for discrete memoryless sources with distortion measure d(· , ·) was considered in Refs. 9, 62 and 63:
The minimization is performed over all p(x, y, u) = p(x, y)p(u|x) and all decoder
Su et al. 46 shown that for U
one can obtain:
such that the rate R * = I(X; U ) 
19
Having considered the main results of source and channel coding with side information, we can design a joint source/channel coding (JSCC) system that 21 generalizes the above approaches. The block diagram of JSCC system with side information is shown in Fig. 10 . For simplicity, assume that the channel is charac- direct compressed channel transmission in the Wyner-Ziv problem communicated 1 with the rate R ≥ H(X|Y ). The simplest 1D interpretation of the above scheme is shown in Fig. 11 . The channel code is represented by a uniform scalar quantizer 3 that at the same time corresponds to a "coarse" approximation of the source data x. The source code is designed based on a lattice code with respect to the above 5 scalar quantizer, assuming amplitude limited attacks or distortions. In particular, 4-PAM is used within each bin of lattice code providing a total embedding rate of 7 2 bits per pixel. It is also assumed that the watermark is encoded according to the Wyner-Ziv problem, using multilevel codes and properly allocated over the image.
9
The decoder extracts the watermark based on the Gel'fand-Pinsker decoding. Then the Wyner-Ziv decoder reconstructs the original data x using the estimated 11 payloadb and the side information y. In the noise-free case, the quality of the reconstructed image will be determined by the specified distortion D of the lossy 
Information-Theoretic Data-Hiding 23
The above JSCC scheme can also be used as a self-recovering system for networks 1 with bit, block or packet losses or erasures. In these case, the payload should be decreased to enable appropriate encoding using error correction codes suited to 3 the erasure channels, or simply using appropriate data allocation with repetitions. This sort of communications represents a form of error resilient coding that can 5 assist the problem of QoS control in public networks. It should also be mentioned the possibility of hybrid analog/digital transmission where the digital counterpart 7 (embedded watermark) can be used to provide additional quality of transmission for authorized users. An extension to the above JSCC is possible in the case of data delivery with a given targeted data quality to different users, that are divided on public users
11
(those who do not know the key) and private users (those who have access to the key). Increasing the embedding distortion D 1 , one can considerably degrade 13 the image/video/audio quality thus making it uninteresting to public users, while private users can still decode the encoded data. Therefore, this scheme can also 15 be used in applications that require "partial data encryption" to enable the secure content delivery to the target users. 
Secure Communications
The goal of secure communications is to securely deliver some content over the 19 public networks. There are several possibilities for secure communications. The first one is a visual "encryption" or scrambling that should provide additional error 21 resilience in the case of wireless networks and networks with packet losses and erasures. The second possibility is steganography that guarantees secure content 23 delivery by hiding the content to be securely communicated into the covert media, whereas the presence of the hidden content presence should not be detected by 25 various detection tools. 27 The goal of visual scrambling consists in the enciphering of visual content in a way suitable for reliable communications over public networks; this prevents access of 29 a third unauthorized party to the enciphered content. The block diagram of visual scrambling is shown in Fig. 12 . The content that should be securely communicated 31 over public networks is scrambled at the encoder based on the private key in such a way that it cannot be anymore visually recognized. Contrary to traditional data 33 enciphering, it is required here to ensure both visual scrambling and error resilient coding. Moreover, to provide a secure solution it is required to avoid additional 35 redundancy in headers, meta data and attachments. It is also preferable to provide format independency and to ensure high efficiency towards erasure channels and 37 channels with varying parameters. Obviously, traditional means cannot completely satisfy these requirements. The network part of communications is concerned in 39 this application with two different issues, i.e. security and robustness. The security assumes that unauthorized deciphering can be applied and the robustness issue 
Visual scrambling
Steganography
Steganography, originally designed for cover or hidden communications, should 9 provide a certain level of security for public communications. The block diagram of steganographic communications is shown in Fig. 13 . The encoding/decoding part 11 of steganography systems has a lot in common with robust watermarking based on Costa's scheme. However, it has reduced requirements towards attacks aiming at 13 the watermark removal and thus it can provide higher embedding rate. It essentially corresponds to high WNR-regime of data-hiding meaning that normally it should 15 withstand unintentional attacks such as format conversion, slight lossy compression and in some special cases analog to digital conversion. While most existing 17 steganographic tools can provide perceptually invisible data-hiding, the stochastic of unauthorized detection to differentiate between the cover and the host data based on a hypothesis testing.
9
The basic scheme for steganography communications requires high-rate communications. Thus, the host interference cancellation issue should be resolved. The first 11 steganographic techniques have been mostly built based on the LSBM embedding. The QIM and SCS based embedding for steganographic purposes, proposed by 13 Eggers et al. 15 and Guillon et al., 22 have proven that the SCS-based steganography is secure according to the Cachin's criteria of -security 5 which requires:
pY (x) denotes relative entropy (or Kullback-
17
Leibler distance) between the cover data X and the stego data Y. However, the relative entropy is a global criteria and does not reflect the local 19 content modifications. This means that the content can be modified locally in such a way that the attacker can detect it either visually or using some specially de-21 signed statistical tests, while the relative entropy can be tuned to be very low. This also valid for the estimation of image quality using the MSE criterion. It was also 23 shown that images can be considerably locally distorted while the MSE indicated acceptable image quality. 53 
25
At the same time, it is obvious that the higher the data embedding rate, the more modifications are introduced into the original content and consequently the easier security of specific image regions". Therefore, the corresponding conclusion is that one should embed the payload in edges an textures due to their high variance and 37 corresponding high probability of error of unauthorized detection. His current research interests are in information-theoretic aspects of digital data-hiding, visual communications with side information and stochastic image modeling for denoising, compression and restoration. He has served as a consultant to private industries in the above areas.
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